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I. INTRODUCTION 
James Wilson helped shape two Constitutions: the United States 
Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution. An examination of 
Wilson’s role in creating these documents reveals that Wilson was one 
of the most influential founding fathers of the 18th century.  This paper 
will show that Wilson admired federalism, the system whereby the 
federal government engages in limited, enumerated activity, while states 
and the people retain much authority.1  This paper will also demonstrate 
 
1 See Andreas Follesdal, Federalism, available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/federalism/ (last visited Sept. 26, 2011) (defining federalism 
generally).  
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that James Wilson favored limiting the power of legislatures, with the 
judiciary serving a fundamental role in that process.  Finally, reviewing 
Wilson’s work in the context Supreme Court case law will show that 
while health care may be a market within which the federal government 
can efficiently and effectively participate, penalizing individuals for not 
buying government mandated health care is not constitutional under the 
Commerce Clause. 
II.   JAMES WILSON’S ROLE IN CREATING THE 
CONSTITUTION 
James Wilson was born near St. Andrews, Scotland on September 
14, 1742.2  Wilson immigrated to Pennsylvania in 1765.3 James Madison 
is often said to be the “founder of the Constitution,” with Wilson 
following the votes of Madison on key issues such as the Connecticut 
Compromise.4  But in 1787, Wilson was ten years older than Madison 
and had more legislative experience.5 The view that Madison is the 
father of the Constitution is linked to Madison creating the Virginia 
Plan and his role as speaker and note-taker during the Constitutional 
Convention.6 Yet, if one looks at the United States Constitution’s 
creation in its entirety, it is apparent that Wilson had a major influence 
at various stages in the creation process.7 Wilson spoke more times than 
Madison during the convention, and Wilson’s views on all three federal 
branches were largely incorporated into the Constitution.8 
While Wilson and Madison often voted the same way, their 
underlying philosophies were considerably divergent.  For example, 
 
2 John Osborne & James Gerencser, James Wilson, THEIR OWN WORDS (July 9, 2003), 
http://deila.dickinson.edu/theirownwords/author/WilsonJ.htm (examiningWilson’s 
biography). 
3 Ashbrook Ctr. for PUB. AFF., Delegates to the Constitutional Convention: James    
Wilson,TEACHINGAMERICANHISTORY.ORG,http://teachingamericanhistory.org/convention/de
legates/wilson.html  (last visited Sept. 5, 2011) (examining Wilson’s biography). 
4  William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U.PA. J. CON. 
LAW 901, 901 (2008). 
5  Interview with William Ewald, Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School 
(Sept. 27, 2011).  
6 Ewald, supra note 4, at 963. See also James Madison, Journal, Tuesday May 29, 1787, 
of the Constitutional Convention, reprinted in THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 
OF 1787  49- 50 (Max Farrand, , Yale Univ. Press 1911) (recording the introduction of the 
Virginia plan by Edmund Randolph in Madison’s notes).  
7 Ewald, supra note 4 generally. 
8 Id. See also Farrand, supra note 6 generally.   
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Madison believed in a system of filtration.9 Under a filtration system, 
people vote for House representatives who elect the Senate, who then 
elects a President (along with judges).10 Wilson, on the other hand, was 
an advocate of popular representation in its own right.11 On May 31, 
1787, both Wilson and Madison voted for a bicameral legislature with 
popular representation in the House of Representatives.12 
On June 15, 1787, Wilson first protested the New Jersey plan on 
the grounds that it encompassed a unicameral legislature and a plurality 
presidency.13 Madison soon followed Wilson in opposing the New 
Jersey plan.14 Wilson also argued throughout the convention for a 
singular president, elected for a short period of time, with the power to 
veto bills, and authority separate from the legislature and judiciary.15 
Where Madison wanted property interests represented by the legislature, 
Wilson argued ardently against such representation.16 
Wilson’s influence was palpable both during and after debate of 
the Constitution. The words “We the People” were almost assuredly of 
Wilson’s mind.17 These words emphasize Wilson’s strong views on 
individual liberty within a federalist system. Whereas Madison left 
shortly after the July 16, 1787 vote for the Connecticut Compromise (a 
peculiar name considering that Oliver Ellsworth of the Connecticut 
Delegation was not present when the Compromise was created), James 
Wilson stayed to complete the Constitution and was one of five 
members on the Committee of Detail (“COD”).18  The other members 
were John Rutledge (Chair, South Carolina), Edmund Randolph 
(Virginia), Nathaniel Gorham (Massachusetts) and Oliver Ellsworth 
(Connecticut).19 On July 26, 1787, the COD began to finalize a draft of 
 
9 Ewald, supra note 4, at 943.  
10 Farrand, supra note 6. 
11 Ewald, supra note 4, at 963. 
12 Farrand, supra note 6, at 54. 
13 Id.  at 254. 
14  Ewald, supra note 4, at 972.  
15  Id. at 950-51. 
16  Id. at 979-81. 
17 Id. at 988. See also Elizabeth Stuart, BYU Graduate May Have Found Draft of U.S. 
Constitution, MORMON TIMES, Feb. 6, 2010, available at 
http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700007460/BYU-graduate-may-have-found-draft-of-
US-Constitution.html (stating that the phrase “We the people” was found on the back of the 
first draft of the Constitution in Wilson’s hand-writing). 
18 Ewald, supra note 4, at 982-83.  
19 Id. 
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the Constitution to present to the states for ratification.20 
The COD, with Wilson as an important member, was responsible 
for aspects of the Constitution such as the Article I, Section 8 Necessary 
and Proper Clause (written by Wilson), the Article I, Section 8 
Enumerated Powers (written by Edmund Randolph & John Rutledge), 
the Article VI, Clause 2 Supremacy Clause (written by Wilson), the Full 
Faith and Credit Clause (written by Rutledge)), and the Article IV, 
Section 2 Privilege and Immunities Clause (written by Wilson or 
Rutledge).21 
Wilson did not participate in the creation of the enumeration of 
powers because he wanted Congress to have general powers, which 
would have expanded the parameters of congressional authority.22 
However, Randolph and Rutledge were able to ensure that Congress’ 
power was listed in Article I.23 Although Wilson was able to put the 
Necessary and Proper Clause into Article I, Section 8 to enlarge the 
scope of the enumerated rights, the clause was blunted by the 
enumeration in Article I, Section 8. After Wilson’s work on the COD 
was finished, Wilson emphasized the enumeration of federal rights as a 
reason for ratification by the states.\ 
III.  WILSON’S VIEWS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF 
THE LEGISLATURE 
If James Wilson represents such an important figure in American 
constitutional history, an examination of his thoughts on constitutional 
power after the Committee of Detail created the Constitution is 
important for understanding the rights of the federal legislature. It is 
clear that Wilson believed the activities of the legislature needed to be 
monitored and restricted, including by the judiciary, in some respect.24 It 
is equally clear that Wilson understood the impact of Rutledge and 
Randolph’s addition of enumerated rights for Congress in terms of 
ensuring that Congress had a tangible parameter in which to operate.25 
 
20 Id.  
21 Id. at 986-92. 
22 Farrand, supra note 6, at 49.  See also Ewald, supra note 4, at 986-7.  
23 Ewald, supra note 4, at 987. 
24 Ewald, supra note 4, at 996-7.  
25 James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting in Philadelphia (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 
The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 339-340 (John M. 
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) (emphasis added). 
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Wilson’s State House Yard Speech on October 6, 1787, defending 
the United States Constitution to the Pennsylvania Legislature, was 
imperative to the passing of the Constitution by both the Pennsylvania 
Legislature and Congress.26 The speech was sent to George Washington, 
who then circulated it to other delegates attempting to persuade their 
states’ citizenry that America needed to replace the Articles of 
Confederation with a stronger national government.27 In this speech, 
Wilson stated: 
It will be proper . . . to mark the leading discrimination between the 
state constitutions and the constitution of the United States. When 
the people established the powers of legislation under their separate 
governments, they invested their representatives with every right and 
authority which they did not in explicit terms reserve; and therefore 
upon every question respecting the jurisdiction of the house of 
assembly, if the frame of government is silent, the jurisdiction is 
efficient and complete. But in delegating federal powers, another 
criterion was necessarily introduced, and the congressional authority 
is to be collected, not from tacit implication, but from the positive 
grant expressed in the instrument of union. Hence it is evident, that 
in the former case everything which is not reserved is given, but in 
the latter the reverse of the proposition prevails, and everything 
which is not given, is reserved. 
This distinction being recognized, will furnish an answer to those 
who think the omission of a bill of rights a defect in the proposed 
constitution: for it would have been superfluous and absurd to have 
stipulated with a federal body of our own creation, that we should 
enjoy those privileges of which we are not divested either by the 
intention or the act that has brought that body into existence. For 
instance, the liberty of the press, which has been a copious source of 
declamation and opposition, what controul can proceed from the 
federal government to shackle or destroy that sacred palladium of 
national freedom? If indeed, a power similar to that which has been 
granted for the regulation of commerce, had been granted to 
regulate literary publications, it would have been as necessary to 
stipulate that the liberty of the press should be preserved inviolate, 
as that the impost should be general in its operation.28 
Wilson makes two separate important points. The first point is that 
states have all the rights not explicitly reserved by the people, but that 
 
26 Ewald, supra note 4, at 913. 
27 Id.  
28 JAMES WILSON, supra note 25 (emphasis added). 
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the federal government only has those rights explicitly granted under the 
Constitution.29 This statement is in line with the creation and 
maintenance of a federalist system, with the states and federal 
government having separate, identifiable roles. Where the federal 
government is authorized to act, its actions take precedence under 
Article VI, Clause 2, better known as the Supremacy Clause.30 Where 
the federal government cannot act because it has not been given an 
explicit right, the states and the people reserve their power. 
Wilson’s first point coincides with his second point, that a bill of 
rights is unnecessary. An initial reading of this statement might lead one 
to believe that Wilson was not an advocate of individual rights. 
However, a deeper analysis exposes the concept that individual rights 
are at the heart of Wilson’s statements. If the federal government only 
possesses a limited amount of enumerated rights to act, then 
documenting our individual liberties is in fact unnecessary because the 
state, or the people, would already possess any rights outside of the 
parameters of Articles I, II, and III. Thus, the enumerated powers listed 
in Article I, Section 8 would constitute the parameters of legislative 
authority, taking into account the narrow expansion of legislative rights 
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, and outside of those 
parameters, the states and the people would be able to operate freely. 
Wilson also expressed his views on legislative authority during a 
series of lectures that he gave at the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School. Wilson wrote: 
I come now to the last head, under which I proposed to treat 
concerning the legislative department: this was, to consider the 
powers vested in Congress by the constitution of the United States. 
On this subject, we discover a striking difference between the 
constitution of the United States and that of Pennsylvania.  By the 
latter, each house of the general assembly is vested with every power 
necessary for a branch of the legislature of a free state.  In the 
former, no clause of such an extensive and unqualified import is to 
be found.  The reason is plain.  The latter institutes a legislature with 
general, the former, with enumerated, powers. Those enumerated 
powers are now subject for consideration.31 
 
29 Id. 
30  Office of the Secretary of the Senate, S.Pub 103-21, Constitution of the United States 
and notes, available at http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm. 
31 James Wilson, Of the Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania – Of the 
Legislative Departmemt, reprinted in 2 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 870 (Kermit 
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During his lecture on constitutional legislative authority, Wilson 
did not seem to think much about the Commerce Clause’s ability to 
expand the enumerated rights of the federal government, stating simply, 
“It is an object of the national government to ‘form a more perfect 
union.’ On this principle, congress is empowered to regulate commerce 
among the several states, to establish post offices . . . .”32 
Wilson’s lectures again reflect a distrust of the legislature. When 
comparing the U.S. Constitution with the British Constitution, Wilson 
wrote: 
[T]he order of things in Britain is exactly the reverse of the order of 
things in the United StatesFalse’An act of parliament, in England, 
can never be unconstitutional, in the strict and proper acceptation of 
the term: in a lower sense it may; viz. when it militates with the 
spirit, contradicts the analogy, or defeats the provision of other laws, 
made to regulate the form of government.’33 
Wilson’s comparison illustrates a salient point: actions by the 
United States Congress can be unconstitutional, if those actions are 
outside the scope of Congress’ enumerated rights. 
Wilson’s lectures illuminate how he views the judiciary in terms of 
checking the power of the legislature. On Great Britain, Wilson wrote 
“. . . there is a very improper mixture of legislative and judicial 
authority vested and blended in the same assembly.  This is entirely 
avoided in the Constitution of the United States.”34 Wilson fought to 
ensure that the judiciary was a separate and co-equal branch of the 
federal government, a branch not subordinate to the legislature.35 
While attempting (ultimately successfully) to persuade 
Pennsylvania to adopt the United States Constitution, Wilson stated: 
In order, sir, to give permanency, stability and security to any 
government, I conceive it of essential importance, that its legislature 
should be restrained; tat there should not only be what we call a 
passive, but an active power over it.  For of all kinds of despotism, 
this is the most dreadful and the most difficult to be correctedFalse 
 
L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007). 
32 Id. at 872. 
33 James Wilson, Comparison of the Constitution of the United States with That of 
Great Britain, reprinted in 1 Collected Works of James Wilson  719-20 (Kermit L. Hall & 
Mark David Hall eds., 2007). 
34 Id. at 736. 
35 Gerard J. St. John, James Wilson: A Forgotten Father, THE PHIL. LAWYER, Winter 
2004, available at http://www.philadelphiabar.org/page/TPLWinter04James 
Wilson?appNum=1. 
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These restraints arise from difference sourcesFalse Under this system 
they may arise likewise from the interference of those officers, who 
will be introduced into the executive and judicial departments.36 
Wilson’s work with Pennsylvania’s Constitution is illustrative. 
Wilson disliked the lack of checks and balances in Pennsylvania’s 
legislature before 1790 (namely, an unicameral legislature, executive 
officers removed at will, and an unsettled judiciary) and was the 
primary author of Pennsylvania’s new Constitution in 1790 providing 
for a bicameral legislature, an executive with a limited veto, and an 
independent judiciary.37 
Wilson’s general approach to constitutional interpretation can also 
be discerned from his time on the United States Supreme Court from 
1789 until his death on August 28, 1798.38  This analysis includes his 
seminal opinion, Chisholm v. Georgia.39 
 
Van Staphorst v. Maryland40 – This was the first case docketed by 
the Supreme Court.41 James Wilson would have heard the arguments 
concerning the Van Staphorst brothers lending money to Maryland and 
the state allegedly defaulting on the loan (according to the lenders).42 
However, the parties settled the case prior to argument before the 
Court.43 
 
West v. Barnes44 - The Court decided the case on procedural 
grounds, ruling that a writ of error must be issued by the clerk of the 
 
36 James Wilson, An Address to the Delegation of Pennsylvania on the Subject of the 
Federal Constitution  (Dec.1, 1787), reprinted in THE DEBATES, RESOLUTIONS, AND OTHER 
PROCEEDINGS, IN CONVENTION, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS 
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA 245 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 
1830) (emphasis added).  
37 Penn Biographies, James Wilson (1742-1798), University of Pennsylvania University 
Archives and Records Center, available at 
http://www.archives.upenn.edu/people/1700s/wilson_jas.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). 
38 Ashbrook Ctr. for PUB. AFF., supra note 3. 
39 Wilson, James (1742-1798), in AMERICAN ERAS (1997), available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/James_Wilson.aspx; 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419(1793).  
40 Van Staphorst v. Maryland (1791). 
41 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800 8 (Maeva March 
eds., Columbia University Press 1996). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 West v. Barnes, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 401, 401 (1791). 
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Supreme Court of the United States.45 
 
Case of Hayburn46 - Wilson’s judicial actions here illustrate his 
view that legislative power is finite. “In 1792, Congress enacted 
legislation that required the United States Circuit Courts to hear 
disability pension claims for veterans of the American Revolutionary 
War and to certify their findings to the Secretary of War.”47 James 
Wilson and four other Supreme Court justices, sitting as Circuit Court 
judges, tendered opinions in letter form  to President George 
Washington declining to serve in that capacity.48 
Wilson wrote in his letter to Washington, “[i]t is worthy to remark, 
that in Congress the whole legislative power of the United States is not 
vested. An important part of that power was exercised by the people 
themselves, when they ordained or established the Constitution.”49 
Wilson further wrote “[u]pon due consideration,  we have been 
unanimously of the opinion, that, the circuit court held for the 
Pennsylvania district could not proceed; Because the business directed 
of this act is not of a judicial nature. It forms no part of the power vested 
by the Constitution in the Courts of the United States. . .”50 
Hayburn demonstrates that Wilson believed that each branch of the 
federal government was given a parameter within which to operate 
under the Constitution.  The three branches cannot impose restrictions 
on each other if the right to do so is not found in the Constitution. 
Wilson’s earlier remarks that the whole of the legislative power is not 
found in Congress further indicates that he was not a proponent of the 
federal government acting outside the scope of powers granted 





46 Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 409 (1792). 
47 Kermit L. Hall, Hayburns Case, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE UNITED STATES (2005), available at http://www.encyclopedia.com/ 
topic/Hayburns_Case.aspx. 
48 Id. (emphasis added). 
49 JAMES WILSON, HAYBURN’S CASE, 2 U.S. 409, 411-414 (1792), reprinted in 
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1, 346-347 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 
2007) (emphasis added). 
50 Id. at 347. (emphasis added). 
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Chisholm v. Georgia51 - Wilson’s most well known decision 
continues to show that he was a strong proponent of individual liberty 
and looked to the words in the Constitution to establish the parameters 
of federal power. In Chisholm, Alexander Chisholm attempted to sue 
Georgia in the United States Circuit Court for money owed to the 
testator, Robert Farquhar, for goods that Farquhar supplied to Georgia 
during the American Revolutionary War.52 Georgia refused to appear, 
stating that appearance would waive any objection to jurisdiction.53 A 
courtroom reporter later observed, “Georgia was right in not appearing 
in this action” because Chief Justice John Jay “said from the bench that 
had the State pleaded it would have been an acknowledgement of the 
jurisdiction of the Court.”54 
Wilson wrote a lengthy opinion upholding the individual’s right to 
sue a state in federal court and emphasizing federalism under the 
Constitution.55 “Let a State be considered as subordinate to the 
PEOPLE: but let every thing else be subordinate to the State.”56 
Wilson’s opinion further reads “[a] State, like a merchant, makes a 
contract. A dishonest State, like a dishonest merchant, wilfully [sic] 
refuses to discharge it: The latter is amenable to a Court of Justice.”57 
Wilson emphasized that it is the people who maintain the most rights 
under our Constitutional framework. 
Wilson turned to the words in the Constitution to decide the case. 
First, Justice Cushing wrote: 
The point turns not upon the law or practice of England. . .but upon 
the Constitution established by the people of the United States; and 
particularly upon the extent of powers given to the Federal Judicial 
in the 2d section of the 3d  article of the  ConstitutionFalseThe 
judicial power, then, is expressly extended to ‘controversies, between 
a State and citizens of another StateFalse58 
Wilson then wrote, “Could the strictest legal language . . . describe, 
 
51 Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419(1793). 
52 Chisholm v. Georgia, WEST’S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW (2005), available at 
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Chisholm_v._Georgia.aspx (last visited Sept. 26, 2011). 
53 Id. 
54 Caleb Nelson, Sovereign Immunity as a Doctrine of Personal Jurisdiction, 115 HARV. 
L. REV. 1559, 1593 (2002). 
55 Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 466. 
56 Id. at 455. 
57 Id. at 456. 
58 Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 466. 
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with more precise accuracy, the cause now depending before the 
tribunal?”59 
Wilson believed the Constitution’s words and phrases formed the 
outer bounds for the powers of federal branches. Here, the words 
explicitly stated that an individual could sue a state in federal court, so 
the judiciary had the power to hear the case.60  Because the states, or 
rather the people, were not satisfied with this result, the Eleventh 
Amendment was passed, and a state could no longer be sued by an 
individual from another state (or under Hans v. Louisiana, by citizens of 
their own state).61 
Chisholm is incredibly important in understanding the parameters 
of federal-branch power under the Constitution. Chisholm also shows 
the Court’s role in determining through judicial review whether an act is 
constitutional, albeit a judicial act. Wilson’s opinion here shows that he 
believed 1) in judicial review and 2) that it is the Constitution’s words 
and phrases that give the federal government the entirety of its power. 
 
Georgia v. Brailsford62 - This case involves Chief Justice Jay 
instructing a jury that the jury has the right to decide both facts and law 
in a trial.63 Although Wilson was still on the Supreme Court in 1794, he 
did not deliver a separate opinion in Brailsford.64 
 
United States v. Peters65 - This case held that the federal district 
court had no jurisdiction over a foreign individual because a ship was 
not within the jurisdiction of the court.  Wilson did not deliver a 
separate opinion in Peters.66 
 
Talbot v. Janson67 - Talbot held that the jurisdiction of the Court 
extended to the seas and that a citizen of the United States could also be 




61 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).  
62 Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794). 
63 Id. at 4. 
64 See generally Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794). 
65 United States v. Peters, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 121 (1795). 
66 Id. 
67 Talbot v. Jansen, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795). 
68 Id.  
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Talbot. 
 
Hilton v. United States69 - This case held that a tax on carriages did 
not violate Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, mandating 
apportionment.70 Importantly, the Court used judicial review to 
determine that the Congressional statute was constitutional. Wilson 
wrote a short opinion joining the majority and stating that his views had 
not changed from the opinion he wrote while in the Virginia Circuit 
Court.71  However, no copy of his opinion in Virginia’s Circuit Court 
exists.72 
 
Henfield’s Case73 - In this Circuit Court case, a jury was 
determining whether Henfield committed an act of hostility against 
members of a United States peace treaty, thus violating the treaty.74 
Pertaining to the case, Wilson stated, “[t]he Constitution of the United 
States has declared that all treaties made, or to be made, under the 
authority of the United States, shall be part of the supreme law of the 
land.”75 Wilson’s statements to the jury further show his strict adherence 
to his belief that federal action should be guided by the words actually 
in the Constitution. 
 
Ware v. Hylton76 - In Ware, the Court held that the Treaty of Paris, 
providing that British creditors from before the American Revolution 
could recover debts owed to them by Americans, overrode a Virginia 
law nullifying these same debts.77 Wilson agreed that the constitutional 
right to make a treaty was supreme to Virginia state law.78 Wilson 
reiterated his view that the Constitution protects individual rights, 
 
69 Hilton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
70 Id. at 173. 
71 Id. 
72 Daniel B. Evans, The Tax Protestor FAQ, EVANS-LEGAL.COM, http://evans-
legal.com/dan/tpfaq.html. (last updated Feb. 27, 2011). 
73 Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Penn. 1793); 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JAMES WILSON, supra note 33, at 367.  
74 Lecture on Law by James Wilson (1790-2), 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, 
supra note 33, at 368. 
75 Id. at 368. 
76  Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). 
77 Id. at 281. 
78 Id.   
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stating, “. . . the Constitution of the United States authoritatively 
inculcates the obligation of contracts.”79 
Wilson’s actions in securing independent judicial and executive 
branches of the United States and Pennsylvania, his speeches after the 
Constitutional Convention, and his Supreme Court opinions all suggest 
that Wilson believed the legislature was capable of abusing its power 
and that other branches, along with the people, needed to serve as 
watch-dogs over the legislature. Wilson also emphasized that the federal 
legislature had limited, enumerated power, while most rights remained 
with the states, or the people. The question is, then, what actions taken 
by our Legislature today would constitute the “abuse” that Wilson 
fought so ardently to avoid? Passing a portion of a statute that 
effectively ends federalism regarding state and individual rights may 
qualify as a sound answer. 
IV. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE: EXPANSION LEADING TO 
UNCHECKED LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY 
As Wilson notes, the federal government only has the power 
granted by the Constitution.80 The extent of the federal legislature’s 
power comes from Article I, Section 8, which explicitly lists all of 
Congress’ powers.  Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 grants Congress the 
power “to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”81 The part of the clause 
giving the federal legislature the authority to regulate commerce among 
the several states has often been called the “Commerce Clause” and will 
be referred to as such.82 Commerce regulated under this clause is often 
referred to as “interstate commerce” and will also be referred to as such 
here.83 
Congress’ power to regulate any activity under the umbrella idea 
that the state or the individual is engaging in “interstate commerce” has 
expanded on a sigmoid curve since the Constitution’s adoption.84 A full 
 
79 Id.  
80 James Wilson, Speech At A Public Meeting In Philadelphia, supra note 25. 
81 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
82 Robert H. Bork & Daniel E. Troy, Locating the Boundaries: The Scope of Congress’s 
Power to Regulate Commerce, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 849, 849-93 (2002), available at 
http://www.constitution.org/lrev/bork-troy.htm. 
83 Id.  
84 See generally KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
82-143 (Robert C. Clark ed., Foundation Press 16th ed. 2007) (1937). 
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review of this growth in federal legislative authority will show that, 
while the Commerce Clause has already been used in ways unstated by 
Wilson, the clause can still be kept within some form of the federalist 
framework he advocated. Conversely and logically, continuing to 
expand the Commerce Clause’s power to include the right to regulate 
non-activity will signal the end of the federalist system as Wilson knew 
it. 
 
Gibbons v. Ogden85 - The New York Legislature granted Robert 
Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive right to operate steamboats 
in New York waters.86 Thomas Gibbons began operating a competing 
steamboat service, licensed under a federal statute for “vessels to be 
employed in the coasting trade and fisheries.”87 Chief Justice Marshall 
upheld Gibbons’ right to operate despite New York’s law because the 
commerce in question was not simply confined to New York, but 
expanded beyond the state’s borders.88 Chief Justice Marshall wrote: 
Comprehensive as the word ‘among’ is, it may very properly be 
restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than one. 
The phrase is not one which would probably have been selected to 
indicate the completely interior traffic of a State, because it is not an 
apt phrase for that purpose; and the enumeration of the particular 
classes of commerce to which the power was to be extended, would 
not have been made, had the intention been to extend the power to 
every description. The enumeration presupposes something not 
enumerated; and that something, if we regard the language or subject 
of the sentence, must be the exclusively internal commerce of a 
State. The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, 
that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the 
nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the States 
generally; but not to those which are completely within a particular 
State, which do not affect other States, and with which it is not 
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the 
general powers of the government. The completely internal 
commerce of a State, then may, be considered as reserved for the 
State itself. 89 
 
85 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
86 Id. at 1. 
87 Id. at 2. 
88 See generally id. 
89 Id. at 194-95. (emphasis added). 
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Because the federal steamboats were engaged in interstate 
commerce, the federal law was constitutional.90 Under the Supremacy 
Clause, any valid federal law preempts state law, so the federal 
steamboat license stood against Livingston and Fulton’s steamboat 
monopoly issued by New York.91 
Marshall also touched upon the judiciary’s role in overturning 
legislative statutes under the Commerce Clause: 
[The commerce power], like all others vested in Congress, is 
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the 
[C]onstitution. . .The wisdom and the discretion of Congress, their 
identity with the people, and the influence which their constituents 
possess at elections, are . . .the sole restraints on which they have 
relied, to secure them from its abuse.92 
It is clear that Marshall believes the will of the people should be 
the final voice of reason, subject only to whether the Constitution 
provides Congress with the initial right to act.  Whether the federal 
legislature possessed that right in the first place would continue to be 
scrutinized judicially. 
The Supreme Court implemented various approaches to ensure the 
parameters of the Commerce Clause were defined and understood.93 
A. Direct Effects Test 
This test, while in line with Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 as 
actually written, is the most restrictive approach to interpreting the 
Commerce Clause. 
 
United States v. E.C. Knight Co.94 – The Court ruled that 
manufacturing ninety-eight percent of the nation’s sugar95 “bore no 
direct relation to commerce between the states” and could not be 
regulated under the Commerce Clause.96  The Court has not favored this 
approach, and instead developed an expansive view of the term 
 
90 See generally id. at 194-95.  
91 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.  
92 Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196-97 (emphasis added). 
93 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 85. 
94 United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). 
95 Id. at 44. 
96 Id. at 17. 
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“interstate commerce,” using the “substantial economic effects” test for 
the most part, while at times also using the “stream of commerce” test. 
B. Stream of Commerce Test 
The Court has also used a “stream of commerce” test.97 Under this 
approach, some local, or intrastate activities could be regulated by 
Congress because the activities could be viewed as “in” commerce or as 
an integral part of the “current of commerce.”98 
 
Swift & Co. v. United States99 – Justice Holmes wrote: 
Commerce . . . is not a technical legal conception, but a practical 
one, drawn from the course of business. ‘When cattle are sent for 
sale from a place in one State, with the expectation that they will end 
their transit, after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so, 
with only the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the 
stockyards, and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course, 
the current thus existing is a current of commerce among the States, 
and the purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such 
commerce.’100 
Under this interpretation, the federal government can regulate 
some intrastate activity under the Commerce Clause. 
C. Substantial Economic Effects Test 
The most expansive test used by the Supreme Court is the 
“substantial economic effects” test which holds that any activity (locally 
or interstate) that, in the aggregate, affects interstate commerce 
physically or economically is part of interstate commerce and can be 
regulated by the federal government. It is this view that has been the 
basis for the Commerce Clause’s nearly unlimited use as the basis for 
federal regulation. 
 
Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co v. United States [The Shreveport 
Rate Case]101 – The Court upheld congressional regulation of intrastate 
rail rates that discriminated against interstate railroad traffic by raising 
 
97 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 87. 
98 Id. 
99 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375  (1905). 
100 Id. at 398-99. 
101 Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914). 
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the prices for routes between Texas and Louisiana compared to routes 
that stayed within Texas.  Justice Hughes wrote: 
Wherever the interstate and intrastate transactions of carriers are so 
related that the government of the one involves the control of the other, 
it is Congress, and not the state, that is entitled to prescribe the final and 
dominant rule, for otherwise Congress would be denied the exercise of 
its constitutional authority and the State, and not the nation, would be 
supreme within the national field . . .  This is not to say that Congress 
possesses the authority to regulate the internal commerce of a state, as 
such, but that it does possess the power to foster and protect interstate 
commerce [of a state], and to take all measures necessary or appropriate 
to that end, although intrastate transactions of interstate carriers may 
thereby be controlled.102 
D. The National “Police” Regulation 
 Congress increasingly used the Commerce Clause in the late 19th 
century to handle problems of morality and criminality.103 
 
Champion v. Ames [The Lottery Case]104 - The Court upheld the 
Federal Lottery Act of 1895.105 The Act prohibited the importation, 
mailing, and interstate transport of lottery tickets.106 Justice Harlan 
wrote: 
Lottery tickets are subjects of traffic and therefore are subjects of 
commerce. . .the suppression of nuisances injurious to public health 
or morality is among the most important duties of government. If a 
State, when considering legislation for the suppression of lotteries 
within its own limits, may properly take into view the evils that 
inhere in the raising of money, in that mode, why may not Congress, 
invested with the power to regulate commerce among the several 
States, provide that such commerce shall not be polluted by carrying 
of lottery tickets from one state to another?107 
The Court used this precedent to sustain many laws prohibiting 
 
102 Id. at 352-53 (internal citations omitted).  
103 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 87. 
104 Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903).  
105 Id. at 363-364. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 354-56.  
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objects or people deemed dangerous from interstate commerce.108 It is 
important to note that even here, Harlan and the other Justices still 
analyzed whether some activity was occurring between the states. 
 
Hammer v. Dagenhart [The Child Labor Case]109 - The Court 
struck down a congressional act of 1916 that excluded the products of 
child labor from interstate commerce.110 Justice Day wrote: 
[The commerce power] is one to control the means by which 
commerce is carried on, which is directly the contrary of the 
assumed right to forbid commerce from moving and thus destroying 
it as to particular commodities. But it is insisted that [the Lottery 
Case, Hipolite Egg and Hoke] establish the doctrine that the power to 
regulate given to Congress incidentally includes the authority to 
prohibit the movement of ordinary commodities.  [These] cases 
demonstrate the contraryFalse[In each] of these instances the use of 
interstate transportation was necessary to accomplish the harmful 
results.111 
Hammer shows the importance of first engaging in commerce 
between states, as the Constitution explicitly states, before federal 
action can be justified. 
E. The New Deal 
Even though the federal government argued that the targeted 
activity had a substantial effect on interstate commerce (using the most 
expansive view of the commerce clause possible), the courts initially 
invalidated much of the New Deal measures that attempted to use the 
Commerce Clause as the basis for federal regulation.112 
 
Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.113 – The Court 
ruled that Congress lacked the power to establish a compulsory 
 
108 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 88; see also Hipolite Egg Co. v. United 
States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (upholding the confiscation of preserved eggs that did not have a 
proper label);  Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (upholding the prohibition of 
transporting women in interstate commerce for immoral purposes). 
109 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
110 Id. at 277. 
111 Id. at 269-71 (emphasis added). 
112 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 91-92. 
113 R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
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retirement and pension plan for all railroad carriers.114 Justice Roberts 
wrote for the majority and stated, “[T]he act is not in purpose or effect a 
regulation of interstate commerce within the meaning of the 
Constitution.”115 Roberts further wrote, “[I]s it not apparent that [such 
regulations] are really and essentially related solely to the social welfare 
of the worker, and therefore remote from any regulation of commerce as 
such?”116 
 
Schechter Poultry Corp v. United States117 – The Court held a 
provision of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, authorizing 
the President to issue “codes of fair competition for the trade or 
industry,” unconstitutional in relation to regulating wages and hours of 
individuals within one state.118Chief Justice Hughes rejected both the 
stream of commerce and substantial effects tests.119 Justice Hughes 
wrote that these were not transactions in interstate commerce:120 
If the federal government may determine the wages and hours of 
employees in the internal commerce of the state, because of their 
relation to costs and prices, and their indirect effect on interstate 
commerce, it would seem that a similar control might be exerted 
over other elements of cost, also affecting price, such as the number 
of employees, rent, advertising, methods of doing business, etc.121 
Justice Day and the Court looked at the impact that this one 
decision could have on federal legislative power in terms of opening 
Pandora’s box. The Court’s concerns are in line with James Wilson’s 
concerns that the expansion of legislative power is the most difficult to 
undo. 
 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co.122 – The Court invalidated a federal 
regulation for minimum wage and maximum hours in coal mines.123 
Justice Sutherland wrote “the effect of the labor provisions of the 
 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 362 (emphasis added). 
116 Id. at 368. 
117 Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
118 Id. at 523. 
119 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 92. 
120 Schechter, 295 U.S. at 542-43. 
121 Id. at 549. 
122 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
123 Id. 
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[Act] . . . primarily falls upon production, and not upon commerce.”124 
Despite Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s attempts to have the 
legislature pass a wide variety of measures under the Commerce Clause, 
the courts looked at the words and phrases in the Constitution to 
determine which actions were permissible, much as Wilson did during 
his time on the Supreme Court. However, frustrated with the Supreme 
Court, Roosevelt launched his court-packing plan.125 Roosevelt’s 
ongoing plan sought to put more judges on the bench and to remove 
judges over seventy years of age.126 While the controversy was ongoing 
with hearings in the Senate, the Court seemed to change direction in a 
number of decisions sustaining regulatory statutes under the Commerce 
Clause. 
 
 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.127 – The Court held valid the 
National Labor Relations Act, which prohibited unfair labor practices in 
interstate commerce.128 Chief Justice Hughes wrote: 
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making 
their relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their 
activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor 
relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not 
enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the 
paralyzing consequences of industrial war?129 
The Court here is clearly shifting toward an expansive view of the 
Commerce Clause, and this shift constitutes the move away from the 
actual words and phrases in Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the 
Constitution. The Court also moved away from federalism as advocated 
and understood by James Wilson. 
 
United States v. Darby Lumber Co.130 - The Court held that the Fair 
Labor Standards Act of 1938, which established minimum wage and 
maximum hours for employees involved in the production of goods in 
interstate commerce, was valid against Darby, even though Darby was 
 
124 Id. at 304. 
125 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 94. 
126 Id. at 95. 
127 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
128 Id. at 49. 
129 Id. at 41-42. 
130 United States v. Darby Lumber Co., 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
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engaged in manufacturing lumber within Georgia.131 
As to the prohibition on shipments of proscribed goods in interstate 
commerce, Justice Stone wrote “[w]hile manufacture is not, of itself, 
interstate commerce, the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is 
such commerce, and the prohibition of such shipment by Congress is 
indubitably a regulation of the commerce.”132 The Court explicitly 
overruled Hammer.133 Notably, the Court continued to analyze whether 
activity between the states existed at some point.134 
As to the validity of federal wage and hour requirements, the Court 
upheld these as well.135 Justice Stone wrote: 
[T]he evils aimed at by the Act are the spread of substandard labor 
conditions through the use of the facilities of interstate commerce for 
competition by the goods so produced with those produced under the 
prescribed or better labor conditions; and the consequent dislocation 
of the commerce itself caused by the impairment or destruction of 
local businesses by competition made effective through interstate 
commerce.  The Act is thus directed at the suppression of a method 
or kind of competition in interstate commerce which it has in effect 
condemned as “unfair.” . . . The means adopted by § 15(a)(2) for the 
protection of interstate commerce by the suppression of the 
production of the condemned goods for interstate commerce is so 
related to the commerce, and so affects it, as to be within the reach of 
the commerce power.136 
However, even Darby is well removed from where the Court 
would next take the Commerce Clause. Wickard v. Filburn represents a 
ruling diverging from the actual words in phrases in Article I, Section 8, 
Clause 3 as James Wilson understood it. 
 
Wickard v. Filburn137 –  In Wickard, Filburn was a farmer in Ohio 
who produced a small acreage of wheat to sell, feed his livestock, use 
for seed, and make flour for home consumption.138 Under the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, Filburn’s quota for wheat 
 
131 Id. at 125-26. 
132 Id. at 113. 
133 Id. at 115-17. 
134 Id. at 113. 
135 Id. at 122-25. 
136 Darby, 312 U.S. at 122-23. 
137 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
138 Id. at 114. 
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production was approximately three acres, but he harvested 
approximately seven acres.139 Even though Filburn’s production was 
limited to his farm, the Court ruled that the activity was a part of 
interstate commerce. The Court wrote, “even if appellee’s activity be 
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, 
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial 
economic effect on interstate commerce False”140 
Wickard either represents the outermost boundary of federal power 
under the Commerce Clause, or the ruling was outside the parameters of 
the Commerce Clause from the start. When compared with the 
statement “[t]he Congress shall have the power to regulate 
commerce . . . among the several states . . . ,” this ruling seems 
inconsistent with the words and phrases in the Constitution.141 Yet, under 
this ruling, most activities would be deemed to fall within interstate 
commerce. 
 
Perez v. United States142 - In determining the constitutionality of the 
Consumer Credit Protection Act prohibiting loan sharking under the 
Commerce Clause, the Court reiterated the parameters of interstate 
commerce.143 Federal legislative action under the Commerce Clause was 
permissible (1) to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, (2) to 
regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and 
persons and things within interstate commerce, and (3) to regulate 
activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.144 
V. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW REGARDING 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION PASSED UNDER THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE 
The Supreme Court did not invalidate any legislation as exceeding 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause for sixty years.145 The 
Court used the substantial effects test which, as noted above, establishes 
a low bar for activity to be deemed interstate commerce. However, in 
 
139 Id. at 119. 
140 Id. at 125. 
141 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
142 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).  
143 Id. at 156-57. 
144 Id. at 150. 
145 SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 84, at 106.  
GOODING FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 12/12/2011  2:25 PM 
2011 JAMES WILSON & THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 53 
the past fifteen years, the Court has returned to ensuring that the bar still 
exists. 
United States v. Lopez146 – The Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 
made it a crime to knowingly possess firearms in school zones.147 Lopez 
brought a handgun to school and was charged under the Act.148 The 
Court held that having a handgun in school did not substantially affect 
commerce between the states.149 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, “[e]ven 
Wickard, which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce 
Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a 
way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does not.”150 
 
United States v. Morrison151 - The Violence Against Women Act 
awarded civil remedies to victims of gender-based violent crimes.152 
Following the ruling in Lopez, the Court wrote: 
Lopez’s review of Commerce Clause case law demonstrates that in 
those cases where we have sustained federal regulation of intrastate 
activity based upon the activity’s substantial effects on interstate 
commerce, the activity in question has been some sort of economic 
endeavor . . . Gender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any 
sense of the phrase, economic activity.153 
 
Gonzales v. Raich154 - The Court upheld the federal legislation 
banning the growth of marijuana pertaining to strictly intrastate 
activity.155 The Court used the maximum capacity of the substantial 
effects test just as it did in Wickard. Justice Stevens wrote, “[i]n both 
cases, the regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power 
because production of the commodity meant for home consumption, be 
it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on supply and demand in 
the national market for that commodity.”156 
 
146 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  
147 Id. at 551 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A) ( Supp. V 1988)). 
148 Id. 
149 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. 
150 Id. at 560. 
151 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
152 Id. at 601-02 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1995)). 
153 Id. at 611, 613. 
154 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
155  Id at 10-33 
156 Id. at 2 
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As noted above, James Wilson was a strong proponent of 
federalism. It is axiomatic that using the Commerce Clause for activities 
well beyond what would first be thought of as “Commerce between the 
States” brings with it a loss of federalism, as the states, or the people, 
are denied the right to engage in some activity as the states or the people 
see fit. However, even this framework leaves the potential for a 
federalist system to work because when the states, or the people, are not 
engaged in any activity the federal legislature cannot reach them 
through the Commerce Clause. 
VI. THE END OF FEDERALISM 
In 2010, Congress passed The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act.157 Section 1501 states: 
An applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 
ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the individual who 
is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential 
coverage for such monthFalse If an applicable individual fails to 
meet the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more months during 
any calendar year beginning after 2013, then, except as provided in 
subsection (d), there is hereby imposed a penalty with respect to the 
individual in the amount determined under subsection (c).158 
Section 1501 sets forth, as the basis for the federal legislative 
action, the following findings: “The individual responsibility 
requirement provided for in this section (in this subsection referred to as 
the “requirement”) is commercial and economic in nature, and 
substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of the effects 
described in paragraph (2).”159 Paragraph (2) lists the ways that health 
care has a substantial impact on the national economy.160 Finally, 
paragraph (3) states that under the Supreme Court ruling in United 
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,161 insurance markets 
fall within interstate commerce.162 
Importantly, Congress’ findings did not base the individual 
 
157 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
158 Id. at 244. 
159 Id. at 242. 
160 Id. at 243. 
161 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
162 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501, 124 Stat. at 244. 
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mandate on generating revenue under the tax and spend provision.163 
Although an analysis here would show that Section 1501 is a penalty 
and not a tax (as described in the statute, “there is hereby imposed a 
penalty with respect to the individual in the amount determined under 
subsection (c)”),164 Congress itself based the propriety of the individual 
mandate on the Commerce Clause.165 As such, the Commerce Clause is 
the basis for examination. 
If Section 1501 of The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
is upheld, the system of federalism Wilson cited so often, whereby the 
federal government has limited power, reserving most of the rights to 
the states, or to the people, would be destroyed. One clause in Article I 
would be the basis for the federal Legislature’s ability to regulate 
virtually anything. Every prior Commerce Clause case analyzed some 
activity to determine if the activity was commercial.  Without activity, 
no commerce can possibly exist.  Here, even if one is the farthest 
removed from engaging in commerce between the states (not engaging 
in any activity at all), one would still be subject to federal regulation. 
Therefore, the sphere for the states and individuals to operate without 
federal intervention would be abolished. 
Fatal to coinciding Section 1501 with any reasonable Wilsonian 
view is the fact that the people would be subject to federal power at all 
times. There is no possible way that the author of the words “[W]e the 
people” in the Constitution contemplated Congressional power that 
usurped virtually all-individual autonomy under the Commerce Clause. 
Wilson’s view that the Constitution left most of the rights to the states 
and the people would be obliterated. 
If the COD ever intended the Commerce Clause to be used in this 
manner, why would the committee list the powers of the federal 
government at all? Similar to Wilson’s original contention, the federal 
legislature would have been given general rights, broadly encompassing 
the right to mandate that people participate in a government program.  
Alternatively, the COD could have simply added the Commerce Clause 
and stopped at this point, as it would have encompassed virtually all 
activity. 
Wilson’s views on granting general rights did not prevail in the 
 
163 Id. at 242. 
164 Id. (“[T]here is hereby imposed a penalty with respect to the individual in the 
amount determined under subsection (c).”) (emphasis added). 
165 See generally The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 1501. 
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COD, and Rutledge and Randolph were able to include specific, 
enumerated rights. After Wilson, Rutledge, Randolph, Ellsworth and 
Gorham completed their work drafting the Constitution, Wilson 
advocated the merits of enumerated rights as much as anyone; he used 
the words and phrases within the Constitution as the basis for his 
Supreme Court decisions, relying heavily on their reasonable meaning. 
Wilson worked tirelessly to ensure that the judiciary had 
independence from the legislature so the judiciary could determine with 
impunity that the legislature’s actions were constitutional (whether the 
Federal Judiciary or Pennsylvania’s).  While on the Supreme Court, 
Wilson also showed that he was a proponent of judicial review and 
limited Congressional power. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
James Wilson was one of the most influential founding fathers of 
the 18th Century in creating the Constitution. James Wilson’s work to 
refine Pennsylvania’s Constitution by reigning in the legislature and 
giving the judiciary autonomy, his statements on the Constitutional 
enumeration of power and limited federal rights, and his Supreme Court 
opinions, demonstrate that James Wilson was a proponent of individuals 
retaining much autonomy under the United States Constitution. A 
reasonable analysis of James Wilson’s views on the Constitution and 
Supreme Court case law generally suggests that Section 1501 should be 
struck down under judicial review. Neither James Wilson nor any 
Justice writing a Supreme Court opinion to date contemplated non-
action as a basis for enacting the Commerce Clause because the 
interpretation cannot be reconciled with the notion that the Constitution 
maintains states’ and individual rights. 
 
